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The relocation of more polluting industries in poorer countries due to gaps in 
environmental standards is known as the pollution haven effect, whereby the scale and the 
composition of output change across countries. Changes in the composition of the output 
mix might translate into changes of comparative advantages across countries, as revealed by 
trade flows. This paper focus on this issue and looks at the changes of bilateral revealed 
comparative advantages (RCAs) in the last decade between China and the major fourteen EU 
countries (EU14). Using industry level data on bilateral trade, air pollution, water pollution 
and several measures of environmental stringency, we find that, controlling for other factors 
that may have affected RCAs, such as labor costs, on average our EU14 countries have kept 
or improved their advantages with respect to China in both water polluting industries (such 
as paper and agro-based industries) and air polluting industries (such as basic metals and 
chemicals), while they have lost competitiveness in the more clean industries (such as 
machinery and fabricated metals).  
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In recent years the need to preserve and improve environmental quality has solicited 
increasing efforts to abate pollution worldwide; renewed effort in rich countries has become urgent 
fearing the still unknown consequences of climate change. The debate on sustainable emission 
targets and required abatement trends has become particularly intense at all levels raising 
coordination problems and free-riding concerns; in fact, while the quality of the environment does 
not depend only on the action taken within each country’s boundaries, the burden of abatement 
costs can only be effectively imposed by governments on domestic producers and consumers.
2  
As long as a “healthier natural environment” is a normal good, demand for it tends to be 
higher in richer countries which impose more stringent environmental regulations as compared to 
poorer ones (so called “environmental Kutznets curve” hypothesis; Copeland and Taylor, 2003). 
However, pollution abatement poses additional burdens on domestic firms, especially those 
operating in the most polluting industries, shifting part of the inputs away from production to 
pollution abatement. If the cost burden is significant enough, it might hurt the international 
competitiveness of domestic firms, compared to firms located in countries with weaker 
environmental standards. The relocation of more polluting industries to poorer countries due to gaps 
in environmental standards is known as the pollution haven effect, whereby the scale and the 
composition of output change across countries (Copeland and Taylor, 2003).
3 The existence and the 
magnitude of such an effect depends on two things: (a) whether environmental regulations impose 
substantial additional costs on polluting industries, and (b) whether, absent other compensative 
policies, regulation differentials are large enough to impact on industry location, output 
composition and trade.
4  
Changes in the scale of activity affect directly profits and jobs within a country; changes in 
the composition of the output mix translate into changes of comparative advantages across 
 
1 I would like to thank Xiaolan Fu, Herman Vollebergh and Valeria Rolli for insightful comments and suggestions on 
earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Pietro Barone, Ivan Faiella, Marco Marinucci for valuable 
discussions. 
2 The possible option of imposing additional taxes on imports of goods from polluting producers encounters major legal 
and practical problems. For a discussion on coordination issues see OECD (2008). 
3 Copeland and Taylor (2004) distinguish between the pollution haven effect and the pollution haven hypothesis. The 
first is the effect, at the margin, on trade flows and plant location of tightening up environmental regulation in richer 
countries; the hypothesis instead refers to the implications for plant location and trade flows of a change in trade 
regimes between countries with different environmental regulations. In our analysis both things are at play, in that in the 
last ten years environmental regulation has become more stringent in richer countries and at the same time trade barriers 
have been reduced. Since our focus is on environmental regulation differentials we refer to pollution haven effect.    
4We might consider the environment as an additional factor of production, together with capital, labor and land; as 
environmental services in poorer countries become relatively cheaper they will be embodied in a larger share in their 
exported goods. However, there is some evidence (Eliste and Fredriksson, 2002, and Grether and de Melo, 2004) that 





countries. This paper focuses on this latter issue.
5 So far very few studies have tested the pollution 
haven effect on revealed comparative advantages in trade (Grether and de Melo, 2004 and Cole et 
al.,  2005). The empirical literature has mainly looked at the effects of environmental regulation on 
plant location decisions and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, either among different regions 
within the same country (Dean et al., 2005 and Zhang and Fu, 2008, for China and, among others, 
Keller and Levinson, 2002, for the US) or between countries with different levels of environmental 
regulation.
6 Results, in particular for the US, point to a weak relationship between plant location 
decisions, or FDI flows, and environmental regulation. Exploring the link between trade flows and 
environmental regulation seems more appropriate as it allows uncovering the impact of both plant 
location choices and other policy-induced changes in industrial output sizes. The literature looking 
at trade flows, however, also reaches mixed conclusions, with results being very sensitive to the 
choice of countries, the empirical specification and the definition of environmental regulation.
7 
In our analysis our measure of international specialization is an index of trade revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA). Previous studies with similar dependent variables tend to find no 
clear evidence of pollution haven effects (Grether and de Melo, 2004, for a set of 52 countries and 
Cole et al., 2005 for the US). We consider the major fourteen EU countries (EU14) and look at the 
changes in the contribution of each industry to the bilateral trade balance with China in the last 
decade. The recent surge of China as world’s top exporter is often attributed not only to its low 
labour costs and rapid capital accumulation but also to its “export dumping” due to weak 
environmental standards compared to richer countries. On the other hand, some EU countries are 
regarded as those which have committed to the most stringent environmental regulation worldwide.  
Aggregate green house gas emission intensity in the EU fell in the last decade, but 
comparatively less in manufacturing and construction industries than in other sectors of the 
economy; the decline has been particularly intense from 1996 to 2000; a renewed effort seem to be 
in place again since 2003 (Fig. 1). At the same time, environmental protection expenditures have 
remained constant in terms of GDP, around 0.4 per cent.   
On the other hand, as documented in Dean and Lovely (2008), in China fast industrialization 
since 1978 has led to a rapid deterioration of the air quality and of many water sources. Against this 
background, in recent years there have been significant improvements in the environmental 
protection legislation, although enforcement is still very weak due to diverging economic interests 
 
5For extensive surveys on the broader relationship between environmental regulation and international competitiveness 
see SWQ (2006) and United Nations (2006).   
6A review of these studies can be found in Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Zhang and Fu (2008). 
7 Grether and de Melo (2004) and Pasurka (2008) offer a summary of the various specifications and findings. Table A4 
in the appendix summarize the findings of the papers mostly related to the present article.  between central and local governments (Zhang and Fu, 2008). Nonetheless, recent available data 
show a certain effort in pollution abatement and treatment: in the last decade total investment in 
industrial pollution treatment (PTI) has shown an increasing trend in terms of GDP, surpassing 1.4 
per cent in 2008, while water and air industrial emissions (per unit of output) declined steadily (Fig. 
2). 
Fig. 1 EU15: Green house gas emission 
intensity  
(tons/thousand value added euros; 1995 prices) 
Fig. 2 China: Total investment in pollution treatment 
(PTI) as percentage of GDP; 
Total waste water discharge (kilos/yuan output; 1995 
prices) and Sulphure dioxide (SO2 ; kilos/thousand yuan 
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Source: EuroStat data and author’s elaboration.  Source: CEIC and author’s elaborations 
 
In this paper we analyze the evolution of the structure of bilateral trade between EU countries 
and China in relation to environmental regulation; in doing so, we suggest a new strategy to look at 
this relationship, which allows to overcome the endogeneity problems associated with the measures 
of environmental regulation usually adopted in the literature, such as pollution abatement costs 
(PAC).
8 We use industry-level data on air-and-water-pollution intensities in China and a cross-
country index of environmental stringency first constructed by Dasgupta et al. (1995) and recently 
extended by Eliste and Fredriksson (2002). Robustness checks are conducted by using: i) an 
additional measure of pollution intensity by industry (the global warming potential (GWP) of 
emissions per unit of output, in Europe); ii) two additional measures of environmental stringency 
(GDP per capita and greenhouse gas emissions).  
Preliminary findings on the evolution of the structural bilateral trade between China and 
EU14 countries in 18 manufacturing industries in the period from 1996 to 2006, indicate that, after 
controlling for other factors affecting trade flows (such as labour costs), there is no evidence of a 









i)  on average our EU14 countries have kept or improved their comparative advantages 
with respect to China, as revealed by their bilateral trade, in both water-polluting 
industries (such as paper and agro based industries) and air-polluting industries (such 
as basic metals and chemicals); 
ii)   on average our EU14 countries have, instead, lost competitiveness in cleaner and 
more internationally-mobile industries (such as communication equipment and office 
and computing machinery), presumably in response to unfavourable unit-labour-cost 
differentials and higher capital accumulation in China.  
The paper unfolds as follows: Section II discusses endogeneity problems of pollution 
abatement costs as proxy for environmental regulation; Section III presents briefly some statistical 
evidence on pollution intensities and revealed comparative advantages in China and Europe; 
Section IV presents our estimation strategy; Section V reports estimation results and Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Pollution abatement costs and environmental regulation 
In principle, the pollution abatement effort in a given country reflects the stringency of its 
environmental regulation. To evaluate and compare the effective cost burden of pollution abatement 
and control (PAC) expenditures we would like to have a reliable measure of such expenditures by 
industries and time. Unfortunately such information is not readily available for a sufficient number 
of countries and time length, and comparison among countries for which data are available must be 
taken with great caution, since definitions differ from country to country.
9 The most comprehensive 
set of data on PAC expenditures and investments, sometimes also specified as pollution treatment 
expenditures (PTE) or investments (PTI), are collected by the OECD (OECD Environmental 
Compendium 2008) and the Euro Stat (2008). In the OECD data the breakdown within countries at 
most distinguishes between public and business sector; in the Euro Stat data the breakdown refers to 
broad industries: manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply and mining and quarrying. The 
time span covered varies from country to country, for some countries data date back to the eighties. 
However, even in these favourable cases, time series are highly discontinuous and again hardly 
comparable across countries. Moreover, as data are too aggregated across sectors, PAC 
expenditures are likely to be endogenous, in that, as the output composition within a macro-
 
9  For a comprehensive survey of available industrial-level PAC data, and their measurement and comparability 




industrial-branch changes, PAC expenditures change accordingly.
10 Therefore, such measures are 
unsuitable to reflect the stringency of environmental regulation in a given country at a given time. 
An alternative way to evaluate pollution abatement costs is by observing polluting emissions 
per unit of output over time, by highly disaggregated industrial sectors. In fact, under the 
assumption that the output composition within a finely defined industrial branch does not change 
dramatically, the evolution of emission intensities would provide an indirect indication of the 
stringency of environmental regulations. Unfortunately, however, there are no time series of 
emissions per unit of output by industrial sectors and by country readily available. Emissions per 
unit of output at 2-digit ISIC classification are available for China in 1995 and 2004 and for six 
major European countries mainly for the year 2000.
11 For the EU and other advanced countries, 
emissions per unit of output for the last fifteen years can be recovered only for the economy as a 
whole or for macro-industrial branches, however, being endogenous to changes in output mix, are 
not suitable to our analysis.
12  
To overcome endogeneity and data shortage problems, in our empirical approach we use a 
country-level index of environmental regulation to be interacted with an industry-level index of 
pollution intensity; the methodology will be made clear in Section IV. As for country-level indexes 
of environmental regulation, in our empirical analysis we use three different measures. The first 
(STRINGi) is a cross-country index, first constructed by Dasgupta (1995) and recently extended by 
Eliste and Fredriksson (2002), based on detailed information about the environmental regulatory 
framework on water, air pollution, land use and biodiversity; higher values of the index correspond 
to higher level of environmental standards.
13 A second measure of environmental stringency is 
given by the level of GDP per capita in 1995 (PCGDPi); higher levels of GDP per capita should be 
associated with higher environmental standards. Finally, we consider an index of greenhouse gas 
 
10 For an extensive discussion on the endogeneity problems that arise when using pollution abatement costs as proxy of 
environmental stringency, see Levinson and Taylor (2008).    
11 For Italy, detailed data for industrial emissions at 2-digit NACE-ISIC classification have been recently released by the 
National Statistics Bureau, ISTAT (http://www.istat.it/dati/dataset/20070625_00/).    
12 The EuroStat is developing a framework to collect industry-level time-series data on emissions linked to economic 
accounts (EuroStat 2001). Up to now EuroStat has made available only data on total Carbon dioxide emissions from 
1995 to 2004 classified by NAICS in manufacturing, mining and services for a large number of countries within EU27 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=0,1136239,0_45571444&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). 
However an inspection of the data reveal that: (a) there are many missing values over time and across industries; (b) the 
number of manufacturing branches for which it is possible to express emissions in intensive form, using gross value 
added classified by NACE, is at most 11; (c) intensities can be expressed only in terms of value added, because output 
volumes are not available for the same classification; (d) emission intensities show several suspicious inconsistencies 
which makes it hard to believe that those emissions can be confronted with national account data on value added. Data 
and elaborations are available from the author upon request.  
13 The index is based on Country Reports prepared for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmental and 
Development. emissions per unit of output in manufacturing and construction, averaged over the period 1995-2005 
(GHGEi); countries with more stringent regulation should score lower values of this index
14  
Figure 3 below shows the dispersion of our proxies for environmental stringency across the 
European countries in our sample; Table 1 sows how the three measures are correlated with each 
other.
15 Even though we concentrate on STRINGi,  PCGDPi and GHGEi in our analysis, for 
completeness purposes, we also report two additional indexes, the Environmental Protection Index 
(EPIi) and the Sustainable Society Index (SSIi); countries with better environmental standards 
should score higher values for these indexes.
16 It is worth noting that the dispersion across EU 
countries is appreciable; in general correlations between these indexes are quite high, with the 
exception of those between PCGDPi and EPIi and PCGDPi and SSIi. 
 
Fig. 3 Environmental regulation proxies in fourteen EU countries 






14 This latter measure is from Euro Stat and reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
15 The index PCGDP is constructed by taking the ratio of each country per capita GDP to the average of the sample 
countries, multiplied by 100; the index GHGE is given by the ratio of the average emission intensities in the 1995-2005 
period in each country to the sample average, multiplied by 100. As shown in Table 1 the index by Eliste and 
Fredriksson (STRING) shows a correlation coefficient equal to 0.53 with PCGDP in 1995, such a correlation grow to 
0.8 in 2005; the correlation coefficient with GHGE is equal to -0.74; the correlation coefficient between PCGDP and 




16 Regression results with these two indexes are qualitatively similar to those found in the main regressions; they 
available from the author upon request. Table 1. Correlations between measures of environmental stringency 
                    STRINGi  PCGDPi  GHGEi  EPIi  SSIi 
STRINGi 1.00         
PCGDPi   0.53  1.00       
GHGEi -0.74  -0.56  1.00     
EPIi 0.50  -0.03  -0.62  1.00   
SSIi 0.53  0.29  -0.66  0.74  1.00 
III. Pollution intensities by industry and bilateral RCA  
The 18 manufacturing industries considered are ranked by pollution intensity according to 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) air emissions and chemical oxygen demand (COD) of water discharge in 
China; an additional measure is provided by the global warming potential (GWP) emissions per 
unit of output in Italy, which is chosen as representative for Europe (see columns 1 to 6 in Table 
2).
17  
Industries are further classified as either resource-based (RB) or non-resource-based (NRB). 
This distinction is important, as RB industries are characterized by a very low degree of 
international mobility compared to NRB ones. Consequently, they may react differently to changes 
in environmental regulation. We will elaborate further on this issue in Section VI.  
For each industry we also compute an index of bilateral trade-revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) with respect to China. Our measure is not straightforward and deserves some explanations. 
























































RCA .                                          (1) 
 
Where: i is the EU reporting country (i=1,...14); j is the industrial sector (j=1,...,18);   ( ) 
are country i’s bilateral exports (imports) to (from) China in sector j; values are expressed in current 
US dollars. Equation (1) measures directly the contribution of each sector to the bilateral trade 





17 We concentrate on SO2j and CODj emissions because the other two emissions available for China, SMOKE and 
DUST (particulate), are strongly correlated with SO2j. The Global Warming Potential (GWP) emission index, instead, 
aggregates three greenhouse gases CO2, N2O and CH4 (with weight 1, 310 and 21 respectively). Moll et al. (2007) have 
calculated GWP per unit of output by 2-digit ISIC classification in 1995 or 2000 for seven European countries 
(Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom). Italian GWP emissions show the highest 
correlation with any other European country, on average the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.91. balance; such a measure does not depend on the size of the overall balance, but only on its 
composition.
18  
An inspection of Table 2 reveals that RCA changes over the period 1996-2006 for the average 
of EU14 countries (column (7)) tend to be negatively correlated with the pollution intensity 
measures, that implies that Europe’s comparative advantages with respect to China have actually 
tended to worsen in the cleanest industries and to improve in the dirtiest ones.
19 
Table 2. S02 and COD emissions in China (kilos per thousand yuan output, 1995 yuan) and changes of RCAs in 
EU14 by industrial sector. 






























Resource-based (RB) industries 
Coke and Petroleum  0.08 0.85 5.11 10 6 3 -0.01
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 5.21 1.41 1.46 125 0.01
Food products, beverages and tobacco  1.16 0.44 0.34 288 0.16
Wood  0.92 1.15 0.33 349 -0.15
Non-resource-based (NRB) industries 
Non-metallic minerals  0.14 4.26 9.76 611 -0.18
Basic metals  0.12 1.26 5.96 732 0.99
Chemicals  0.67 1.13 1.80 454 0.39
Rubber and Plastics  0.10 0.26 0.49 91 16 0.55
Motor vehicles  0.06 0.06 0.44 12 15 7 1.58
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  0.66 0.54 0.31 57 1 0 2.05
Fabricated metals  0.08 0.32 0.30 11 9 11 -0.19
Machinery  0.05 0.18 0.23 14 12 12 -0.02
Transport equipment  0.06 0.06 0.22 13 16 13 -0.42
Furniture and Other Mfg.  0.12 0.28 0.20 81 0 1 4 1.10
Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments  0.05 0.08 0.19 15 14 15 1.01
Electrical Machinery   0.02 0.16 0.16 18 13 16 0.62
Communications Equipment  0.03 0.03 0.16 17 18 17 -5.10
Office and Computing Machinery  0.03 0.03 0.06 16 17 18 -2.40
 
Source: Dean and Lovely (2008); Moll et al. (2007); EUKLEMS database; OECD-STAN bilateral trade database and author’s 
elaborations.  
Note: Sectors are classified according to the 2-digit ISIC rev. 3 nomenclature. RB indicates resource-based industries, NRB non-
resource-based industries based on UNIDO definitions reported in Malatu et al. (2004). RCA are based on equation (1), changes are 
computed on the difference between the average value of index over the period 2001-2005 and the average value of the index in the 
period 1996-2000.  
 
                                                            
18 The index varies between -50 and +50 and the sum across all the j sectors is equal to zero. A positive (negative) sign 
of the index in sector j indicates that the reporting EU country has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in that 
sector, relative to all other sectors. This index allows to rank the products according to their importance, takes into 
account intra-industry flows and allows for international comparisons (Marconi and Rolli, 2008). Detailed data for each 




19 The evolution of bilateral trade RCAs with respect to China clearly does not describe the entire sectoral evolution of 
production in EU14; indeed, if we look at the evolution of value added by industry we find a positive correlation with 
the rankings by pollution intensity (0.5), meaning that in the last decade the cleanest industries have benn also the most 
dynamic ones in Europe (see also Appendix, fig. A1a and A1b). Also, it is interesting to note that, despite possible differences in pollution intensities between 
EU countries and China due to different output mix or eco-efficiency, the ranking of industries by 
SO2 emissions in China (column (5)) and by GWP emissions in Europe (column (6)) are quite 
similar (correlation of 0.8).  
IV. The empirical strategy 
The model - In order to measure the impact of environmental regulation on the evolution of the 
structure of bilateral trade between EU14 countries and China, we want a dependent variable as 
much as possible independent of macroeconomic effects. In much of the existing empirical 
literature, the dependent variable is specified as industry’s net exports normalized by industry’s 
value added, we use, instead, our index of RCA described in equation (1) departing from the 
literature in two ways: (a) we take bilateral, instead of total trade;  (b) we normalize net exports by 
gross flows (a normalization better suited for international comparisons).
 20  
We estimate the following equations: 
) 2 ( . *
* 2
4
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ij i j ij ij i j ij string GWP ULC RVASH RCA ε β β β α α + + + + + = Δ − * 3 ) 1995 ( 2 ) 1995 ( 1 ) 1999 2006 ( .                                          (3) 
Where our dependent variable   is the change of bilateral RCAij between country i 
and China in sector j, in the 1999-2006 period; RVASHij is the share of value added of sector j in 
country i, in real terms, relative to the average sector share across EU14 in 1995.
) 1999 2006 ( − Δ ij RCA
21 ULCij is the unit 
labour cost in sector j in country i; it is measured as nominal wage over value added at 1995 prices. 
The next three variables are our variables of interest, i.e., the pollution haven variables. These 
variables are constructed interacting industry-specific pollution intensities (as measured by SO2j 
emissions,  CODj emissions, or, alternatively in equation (3), GWPj emissions) with country-
specific indexes of environmental regulation (stringi). The methodology of interacting an industry 
characteristic (in our case pollution intensity) with a country characteristic (in our case, the 
stringency of environmental regulation) was proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). These 
interacted variables have the advantage of varying across industries and countries and should 
capture the pollution haven effect. We expect that a more stringent environmental regulation should 
                                                            




21 The value added share of sector j in country i is normalized with respect to the EU14 average share of sector j. A 
similar role would be played by trade specialization by sector at the beginning of the period. Indeed, running 
regressions replacing RVASH with the index of “Export specialisation relative to OECD23 and total manufacturing 
(XSPEC23M)” taken from OECD STAN, leaves results qualitatively unchanged. Results are available from the author 
upon request. induce a worsening of RCAs in more polluting industries and, conversely, an improvement in less 
polluting ones. 
RVASHij  and ULCij  are intended to capture, respectively, Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(henceforth H-O-S) and Ricardian determinants of RCAs. According to the H-O-S theory, which 
assumes same technologies across countries, countries specialize according to their relative factor 
endowments; this means that relative industrial composition, as captured by the relative shares of 
value added in industry j of country i, RVASHij, should reflect relative endowments in European 
countries. For the Ricardian argument, instead, countries tend to specialize according to their 
relative productivity, summarized by unit labor costs (ULCij). As it is plausible that both 
endowments and technology play a role in shaping RCAs with respect to China, we include both 
variables in our regression. Negative (positive) coefficients for initial specialization differentials 
should capture convergence (divergence) of endowments, while unit labor costs differentials should 
capture Ricardian comparative advantages.
22  
In order to correct for high volatility in trade data first we take 3-year moving averages of 
RCAs, and subsequently we take the average over the latest ten-years available. Finally,  j α  and  i α  
capture industry and country-specific fixed effects, reducing the omitted variable bias. The choice to 
concentrate on bilateral trade between EU countries and China eliminates the need to control for 
tariffs and other common variables.  
As the pollution intensity of industries might differ between China and Europe in equation (3) 
we use the Global Warming Potential of industries in Europe (GWPj), as alternative industry-
specific pollution variable. In Table 3 we report the correlations between industrial-pollutant 
intensities; it is worth nothing that  with GWPj  and SO2j are highly correlated (0.87).    
Finally,  stringi ( stringi=  STRINGi, PCGDPi, GHGEi) is the index of the stringency of 
environmental regulation in country i. PCGDPi and STRINGi should act in the same direction, that 
is higher levels of the index should imply higher demand for environmental protection; on the 
                                                            
ε +
22 RVASH should be interpreted as a comprehensive measure of relative factor endowments, possibly reflecting 
both physical and human capital. For robustness check we construct also a measure of physical and human capital 
intensities (kij and hij) given by the interaction of industry-specific intensities ( , )  with country-specific 
endowments of physical and human capital ( , ), as suggested in Nunn (2007). In this case the equation becomes: 
j k j h
i k i h
ij i j ij i j i j i j
C




Industry-specific human and physical capital intensities are derived from US data. As results are essentially unchanged, 
we do not report them; they are available from the author upon request. contrary, GHGEi works in the opposite direction (higher values of GHGE indicate more polluting 
emissions per unit of output and, therefore, lower environmental standards). 
Table 3. Correlations between industrial pollutant 
  SO2j SO2j*RB SO2j*NRB COD j   COD j *RB  COD j *NRB 
COD j 0.21      1     
COD j  *RB   0.68     1   
COD j *NRB      0.28      1 
GWP j 0.87      -0.04     
GWP j  *RB   0.15     -0.19  
GWP j *NRB      0.95      0.18 
 
 
The data - Trade data, classified by 2-digit NACE-ISIC rev. 3 nomenclature, are from the OCSE-
STAN Bilateral Trade database. Data on value added and labour compensations are from the 
EUKLEMS database (available at http://www.euklems.net/), these data are classified by 2-digit 
NACE –ISIC rev.3 nomenclature. Data on SO2j and CODj emissions (kilos per thousand of 1995 
Yuan in 2004), classified by 2-digit ISIC rev.3 nomenclature, are from Dean and Lovely (2008) and 
are reported in Table 2 above and Table A1 in the Appendix. Industry-level data on “Global   
warming potential” are from Moll et al (2007). The variable STRING is from Eliste and Fredricson 
(2002). Greenhouse gas emissions in manufacturing and construction and value added for EU14 are 
from Euro Stat. Per capita GDP at 1995 prices and 2005 purchasing power parities are from the 
World Bank. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is from http://epi.yale.edu/Home; the 
Sustainable Society Index (SSI) is available at http://www.sustainablesocietyindex.com/ssi-
2008.htm.   
V. Results 
As anticipated in the previous section, the expected signs of our coefficients are the following: 
β1 <0 (>0) indicates convergence (divergence) of relative endowments;  
 β2 <0 indicates that higher unit labour costs differentials tend to worsen RCAs with respect to 
China; 
 β3 <0 and β4<0 indicate that countries with more stringent environmental regulations tend to 
reduce their RCAs with respect to China in air and water polluting industries (the sign should 
be positive when the stringency variable is proxied by GHGE);  
 
 
15Regression results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The first thing to note is that the dummy 
that distinguish between RB and NRB industries plays an important role in identifying 
convergence, labour cost effects and pollution haven effects. Results for equation (2) and (3) 
(reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively) show as expected, negative and statistically significant 
values for β1 and β2; moreover, those coefficients are larger in absolute value in NRB industries, 
meaning that EU countries have tended to diminish their RCAs with respect to China in the more 
mobile industries with high unit-labour costs and relative high value-added shares at the beginning 
of the period.  
Turning our attention to the pollution variables, as we can see from the bottom part of Table 4 
there is evidence that, within the subsample of NRB industries, the EU14 countries have tended to 
improve their RCAs in the most polluting industries, especially the most water polluting ones. This 
pattern is robust to the definition of environmental stringency. It is worth noting, however, that if 
we change the classification of the paper and printing industry (ISIC 21-22), including it in the 
NRB subsample, while all signs and significance of the other coefficients are unchanged, that for 
the water-pollution variable (interacted with the NRB dummy, ( ) NRB string COD i j * * ) lose its 
significance, reflecting the fact that the paper and printing industry is the most water-polluting 
industry and EU14 countries have, on average, slightly improved their RCAs with respect to China 
in this sector (see Table 2 and A2).
23  
As for the RB industry subsample, the coefficients associated with the pollution variables in 
Table 4 are not significant, meaning that, if we measure pollution according to SO2 emission 
intensities in China, we cannot really detect any pattern due to environmental regulation.  
If we look at correlations shown in Table 3, we see that it is precisely in RB industries that 
SO2j  emissions per unit of output in China and GWPj emissions in Europe show the lowest 
correlation. Therefore, in regressions (3) we replace the pollution haven variables of equation (2) 
with  . Results are reported in Table 5.   i j string GWP *
Overall, when we measure pollution according to the GWPj we find that for NRB industries 
the direction of the impact is the same as before; i.e.  NRB , 3 β >0 (<0) for string=STRINGi, PCGDPi 
(string=GHGEi)), with the coefficient associated to STRINGi and GHGEi still very significant (at 
5% and 1% level, respectively). As for RB industries, instead, although the coefficients of our 
pollution haven variables are not significant, their signs are now reversed, pointing to a de-
                                                            
23 Results are available from the author upon request. 
 
 
16specialization away from pollution-intensive sectors (relative to China) because of their 
environmental impact ( RB , 3 β <0 (>0) for string= STRINGi, PCGDPi (string=GHGEi)).
24,25 
Summing up, after controlling for unit labour costs, endowment-convergence effects and the 
degree of international mobility, there is no evidence that environmental regulation enacted in 
Europe has negatively affected the structure of bilateral trade with China in a predictable way. This 
conclusion holds true when different definitions of pollution-intensity and environmental regulation 
are considered. Only in few RB industries (such as Coke and Petroleum and Wood) there might 
have been a tendency in Europe to de-specialize away with respect to China in response to a stricter 
environmental regulation.    
                                                            
24 Results, however, are sensitive to the inclusion of paper and printing among the RB industries. When we exclude this 
industry from the RB subsample, the pollution haven parameters associated to RB industries become significant, again 
pointing to a de-specialization away from pollution-intensive RB industries. However, RB-industries are a few (now 
just three out of eighteen) and the result might not be robust; in this respect, results obtained on NRB-industries is more 




25 Our findings seem coherent with Moll et al. (2007) based on NAMEA tables for seven EU countries. In their words: 
“Perhaps contrary to expectation there is no dominant trend of net shifting (i.e. ‘exported’ pressures minus’ imported’ 
pressures) of pressures abroad in the four pressure categories [Global Warming Potential, acidifying substances, ozone 
precursor substances and Direct Material Input]  except for material extraction”. A similar finding for the US is 
documented in Levinson (2008). TABLE 4. EU14 BILATERAL RCAs WITH RESPECT TO CHINA AND POLLUTION PER UNIT OF OUTPUT IN CHINA   
ij i j i j ij ij i j
C
ij string COD string SO ULC RVASH RCA ε β β β β α α + + + + + + = Δ − * * 2 ) 2 ( 4 3 ) 1995 ( 2 ) 1995 ( 1 ) 1999 2006 (
 
Variable  (1)  STRING (2)  PCGDP (3)  GHGE 
) 1995 ( ij RVASH   -1.18***   -1.21***    -0.74**  
) 1995 ( ij ULC   -4.34*   -4.41*    -3.94*   
i j string SO * 2   1.58*   1.04    -0.77**   
i j string COD *   0.69   -0.1    -0.23   
R-squared  0.25   0.24    0.27   
RB RVASHij * ) 1995 (   -0.88 -1.12*  -0.92  -0.99*  -1.04*  -1.24** 
NRB RVASHij * ) 1995 (   -1.23** -1.27***  -1.31*** -1.32***  -0.24  -0.16 
RB ULCij * ) 1995 (   -1.63* -1.60* -1.39  -1.38*  -1.61  -1.36 
NRB ULCij * ) 1995 (   -6.16** -6.03**  -6.40**  -6.54** -5.61**  -5.44** 
( ) RB string SO i j * * 2   0.70   -1.95    -0.46   
( ) NRB string SO i j * * 2   1.62*   1.04    -0.89***   
( ) RB string COD i j * *    0.92    -0.12  -0.42 
( ) NRB string COD i j * *    27.19***    25.38***  -12.93*** 
Adj R-squared  0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.34 
Observations  248 248 248 248 231 231 
Notes: Dependent variable   from eq. (1). ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimate is significant 
respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All the regressions include 
country and industry dummies. The heading of the columns (STRING, PCGDP and GHGE) indicate the definition of 
environmental stringency adopted in the regression. The dummy RB (NRB) take value 1 if the industry is classified as 
resource based (non-resource based), zero otherwise (see table 1). 
C




TABLE 5. EU14 BILATERAL RCAs WITH RESPECT TO CHINA AND GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIAL PER UNIT OF OUTPUT IN 
EUROPE 
ij i j ij ij i j
C
ij string GWP ULC RVASH RCA ε β β β α α + + + + + = Δ − * ) 3 ( 3 ) 1995 ( 2 ) 1995 ( 1 ) 1999 2006 (  
Variable  (1)  STRING (2)  PCGDP (3)  GHGE 
      
) 1995 ( ij RVASH   -1.18*** -1.22***  -0.75** 
) 1995 ( ij ULC   -4.37** -4.45**  -4.07* 
i j string GWP *   4.47* 3.31  -2.23** 
R-squared  0.24 0.24  0.27 
      
RB RVASHij * ) 1995 (   -0.93 -0.87  -1.10* 
NRB RVASHij * ) 1995 (   -1.27*** -1.31***  -0.32 
RB ULCij * ) 1995 (   -1.50* -1.26  -1.22 
NRB ULCij * ) 1995 (   -6.27** -6.36**  -5.78** 
( ) RB string GWP i j * *   -6.03 -9.04  2.78 









Notes: Dependent variable   from eq. (1). ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimate is significant 
respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. All the regressions include 
country and industry dummies. The heading of the columns (STRING, PCGDP and GHGE) indicate the definition of 
environmental stringency adopted in the regression. The dummy RB (NRB) take value 1 if the industry is classified as 
resource based (non-resource based), zero otherwise. Column (a) refers to the RB-NRB classification reported in Table 
1. Column (b) refers to the same classification but the paper and printing industry (ISIC 21-22) is classified as NRB. 
C








VI. Conclusion  
In recent years the international debate on climate change, sustainable greenhouse gas 
emissions and required investment in pollution abatement has become particularly intense at all 
levels, raising coordination problems and free-riding concerns. If poorer countries have weaker 
environmental standards with respect to richer ones, we may expect they enjoy lower production 
costs in more polluting industries and therefore international competitiveness gains in these 
industries (pollution haven effect). This paper analyzes whether and how environmental regulation 
has affected the pattern of bilateral trade between China and fourteen EU countries (EU14) in the 
last decade. The analysis is relevant because, on the one side, EU has promoted itself as the region 
committed to the most stringent environmental regulation while, on the other side, China is often 
indicated as a pollution haven.  
We test the hypothesis regressing the changes of bilateral RCAs between our EU14 countries 
and China in 18 manufacturing sectors on initial factor endowments, unit labour costs and industry-
specific pollution intensities interacted with country-specific measures of environmental stringency. 
We find no evidence of a pollution haven effect. In particular, we find that: 
i)  on average our EU14 countries have kept or improved their advantages with respect 
to China in both water-polluting industries (such as paper and agro-based industries) 
and air-polluting industries (such as basic metals and chemicals); 
ii)  on average our EU14 countries have lost competitiveness in the more mobile and 
clean industries (such as communication equipment and office-and-computing 
machinery). This latter result has occurred in response to unfavourable unit labour 
cost differentials and higher capital accumulation in China.  
We conclude that for the more mobile industries traditional factors still play a dominant role 
in shaping international competitiveness of European industries. Such results may reflect, on the 
one side, the fact that the additional costs eventually imposed by environmental regulation in 
Europe are compensated by the savings due to higher energy and eco-efficiency standards 
(Vollebergh, 2007, and Moll et al., 2007), and, on the other side, the fact that environmental 
regulation in China might have become more stringent. Our findings seem in line with those 
recently reported by the OECD/IEA (2008). 
Results, however, must be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons: first they are 
based on a rather broad industry classification (18 manufacturing sectors), which does not allow to  
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control for changes in the output mix within sectors (that is, toward a cleaner composition in Europe 
compared to China); and, second, even though the environmental regulation in Europe has not 
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Table A1. China: Polluting emissions by industry and type of pollutant in 2004 
ISIC  Rev.3     
2-digit code Industry name
Resource Based (RB)         
Non Resource Based (NB)  COD SO2 Smoke Dust 
15 Food Products and Beverages  RB 1.59 0.59 0.66 0.04
16 Tobacco RB 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco RB 1.16 0.44 0.49 0.03
17 Textiles NRB 0.73 0.7 0.27 0.03
18 Wearing Apparel  NRB 0.44 0.35 0.17 0.02
19 Leather Shoes  RB 0.7 0.23 0.16 0.01
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear NRB 0.66 0.54 0.23 0.02
20 Wood RB 0.92 1.15 1.38 0.58
21 Paper RB 6.95 1.86 1.08 0.07
22 Printing RB 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.00
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing RB 5.21 1.41 0.82 0.05
23 Coke and Petroleum  RB 0.08 0.85 0.58 0.19
24 Chemicals NRB 0.67 1.13 0.54 0.16
25 Rubber and Plastics  NRB 0.1 0.26 0.11 0.05
26 Non-metallic minerals  NRB 0.14 4.26 3.24 14.07
27 Basic metals  NRB 0.12 1.26 0.50 0.90
28 Fabricated metals  NRB 0.08 0.32 0.14 0.10
29 Machinery NRB 0.05 0.18 0.12 0.08
30 Office and Computing Machinery  NRB 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
31 Electrical Machinery  NRB 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.41
32 Communications Equipment  NRB 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instrum  NRB 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.0
34 Motor vehicles  NRB 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
35 Transport equipment  NRB 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
36 Furniture and Other Mfg.  NRB 0.12 0.28 0.19 0.34
Classifications of Industries  Emissions (kg/1000 yuan output, 1995 prices)  
 
         Source: Dean and Lovely (2008) and author’s elaborations.
 
 
23 Table A2. RCA with respect to China in selected EU countries 
ISIC Sector AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT ESP SWE  U K
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco -0.44 0.22 8.55 -0.04 -0.16 -0.81 0.13 2.05 -0.71 4.03 -0.12 0.67 -1.56 0.30
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear -13.59 -7.47 -15.44 -15.92 -11.00 -11.44 -1.31 -4.63 -10.07 -4.97 -2.96 -5.45 -14.73 -5.62
20 Wood 1.43 -0.21 -0.10 -0.31 -0.34 0.07 -0.10 -0.28 -0.37 -0.38 1.39 -0.17 -1.21 -0.22
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.72 0.13 0.59 3.72 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.30 -0.06 0.64 5.90 0.32 1.91 0.24
23 Coke and Petroleum  -0.02 0.02 -0.20 -0.20 -0.46 -0.13 0.10 .. -0.23 -0.07 .. -0.05 -0.89 0.04
24 Chemicals 1.11 11.20 0.69 0.49 1.06 1.45 2.72 8.03 0.54 3.35 1.05 2.83 -0.07 1.35
25 Rubber and Plastics  -0.64 -0.55 -1.05 -1.01 -1.68 -0.86 -0.12 -0.27 -1.16 -0.77 -0.79 -0.64 -1.15 -0.82
26 Non-metallic minerals  -0.52 0.80 -0.56 -0.49 -0.05 -0.28 1.18 -0.22 0.47 -0.31 -0.38 0.85 -0.92 0.03
27 Basic metals  1.90 0.54 0.11 0.36 1.20 0.96 0.03 0.15 0.25 -0.26 0.09 1.02 0.09 0.73
28 Fabricated metals  -1.05 -0.78 -0.25 -0.48 0.45 -0.92 -0.39 -0.47 -0.64 -0.07 -0.48 2.36 -2.19 0.53
29 Machinery 17.66 4.27 8.13 8.61 4.31 15.32 -0.65 0.70 19.03 6.42 -0.38 3.60 1.71 4.70
30 Office and Computing Machinery  -1.84 -1.52 -0.33 -2.66 -4.13 -3.32 -0.20 0.52 -1.17 -5.89 -0.60 -1.07 -0.50 -1.16
31 Electrical Machinery  0.96 -1.01 1.69 -3.54 0.52 -0.20 -0.27 -2.94 -1.29 -0.18 0.66 0.62 0.26 -0.66
32 Communications Equipment  -1.27 1.11 -0.15 16.24 -0.20 0.74 0.01 -0.87 -0.33 -0.04 -1.54 -1.17 22.19 2.23
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instrum  -0.14 -1.15 0.84 -0.44 -0.74 0.18 -0.17 -0.22 -1.22 0.50 -0.37 -0.98 -0.04 0.50
34 Motor vehicles  0.71 0.52 1.21 0.30 2.42 2.43 0.00 -0.02 1.10 0.24 0.90 0.38 0.81 0.73
35 Transport equipment  0.62 -0.16 0.25 -0.13 14.92 1.54 -0.01 0.08 0.68 0.71 -0.07 -0.04 0.26 0.81
36 Furniture and Other Mfg.  -5.59 -5.96 -3.96 -4.51 -6.34 -4.91 -0.98 -1.99 -4.81 -2.95 -2.27 -3.08 -3.99 -3.70
ISIC Sector AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT ESP SWE  U K
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco -0.38 0.23 4.12 0.24 0.71 -0.59 0.61 1.24 -0.24 1.29 -0.08 0.53 -0.69 0.70
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear -10.26 -5.44 -9.85 -6.48 -7.27 -7.27 -0.45 -2.20 -7.26 -1.70 -3.54 -3.83 -10.84 -4.67
20 Wood 0.11 -0.29 -0.35 0.14 -0.26 -0.22 -0.06 -0.54 -0.26 -0.11 1.25 -0.18 -0.56 -0.31
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.44 0.01 0.01 3.36 0.16 0.28 -0.03 0.55 0.06 0.32 1.90 0.24 5.19 0.10
23 Coke and Petroleum  -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.32 -0.04 0.24 0.06 -1.05 -0.04
24 Chemicals 0.74 8.80 1.83 0.78 2.37 1.64 0.09 4.09 1.11 4.02 -1.54 3.33 2.10 2.28
25 Rubber and Plastics  0.23 -0.47 -0.31 -0.44 -0.56 -0.15 -0.13 -0.23 -0.46 -0.12 -0.93 -0.19 -1.12 -0.42
26 Non-metallic minerals  -0.09 -0.38 -0.42 -0.29 -0.07 -0.24 -0.03 -0.30 -0.58 -0.12 -0.39 -0.31 -1.03 -0.21
27 Basic metals  1.93 1.70 -0.04 4.65 1.29 2.50 0.26 -0.03 0.85 1.03 -0.44 0.54 3.70 1.63
28 Fabricated metals  -0.58 -0.54 -0.33 -0.37 -0.54 -0.58 -0.14 -0.30 -0.47 -0.09 -1.19 -0.27 -2.73 -0.59
29 Machinery 15.57 4.62 9.57 12.04 3.13 13.92 0.32 0.28 12.23 3.21 0.07 1.25 8.74 3.22
30 Office and Computing Machinery  -4.77 -2.97 -1.28 -5.90 -5.88 -8.75 -0.10 -10.19 -1.04 -6.70 -1.17 -1.24 -0.68 -1.24
31 Electrical Machinery  0.34 0.27 1.18 -5.13 0.92 0.68 0.03 -0.91 0.35 0.20 -0.58 1.30 1.01 0.07
32 Communications Equipment  -5.28 -2.11 -2.13 -0.77 -2.39 -7.04 0.00 9.55 -1.71 -3.03 9.57 -1.91 2.82 -0.77
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instrum  0.90 -0.09 1.64 0.84 0.43 1.50 0.06 0.42 -0.46 2.59 -0.66 -0.07 1.10 1.08
34 Motor vehicles  2.80 0.31 0.98 0.07 2.18 5.74 0.00 -0.03 0.55 0.19 0.97 1.65 1.71 1.30
35 Transport equipment  2.09 -0.20 -0.37 -0.61 9.57 2.58 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.23 0.95 -1.41 1.22








Fig. A1a index of value added by manufacturing sector in 2005 (1999=100) 
and sector’s global warming potential (GWP) 
Fig. A1b. RCAs with respect to China by country and manufacturing sector in 
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Source: Author’s elaborations on EUKLEMS and OECD Data. 
 
Table A3. EU: Greenhouse emissions intensity - Manufacturing and construction industry (tons/thousand value added euros; 1995 prices) 
year Austria Belgium Denmark EU15 Finland France Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
1995 0.32 0.66 0.23 0.35 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.48 0.28 0.46
1996 0.32 0.65 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.31 0.22 0.65 0.41 0.43 0.52 0.42 0.28 0.46
1997 0.34 0.59 0.23 0.35 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.66 0.42 0.40 0.53 0.45 0.27 0.45
1998 0.30 0.63 0.23 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.63 0.39 0.39 0.51 0.43 0.24 0.44
1999 0.28 0.59 0.23 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.20 0.55 0.41 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.21 0.44
2000 0.27 0.58 0.22 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.18 0.58 0.41 0.35 0.51 0.42 0.20 0.42
2001 0.27 0.57 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.18 0.54 0.39 0.34 0.48 0.44 0.20 0.43
2002 0.28 0.54 0.22 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.19 0.39
2003 0.28 0.54 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.48 0.46 0.19 0.39
2004 0.27 0.50 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.74 0.41 0.35 n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.38
2005 0.28 0.47 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.19 n.a. 0.39 0.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.38
2006 0.26 0.45 n.a. 0.28 n.a.  0.25 0.18 n.a. 0.38 0.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.




Table A4. Most recent and related studies on trade and pollution haven effect  
Paper Countries/years Industry details Dependent variable Environmental regulatory variables  Control variables Results
Malatu et al. (2004)
Germany, Netehrlands 
and US                 
1977‐1992
9                  
two‐digit‐ISIC 
manufacturing 
industries
Net Exports/Value Added in 
industry
 Capital expenditure for pollution 
abatement and control/Gross fixed 
capital formation                      
(PACE)
GFCF, Skilled and Unskilled 
labor, R&D expenditures, 
Tariffs
Mixed evidence: PACE negative and 
significant for the US, negative and 
not‐significant for Germany, positive 
and significant for the Netherlands.
Grether and de Melo (2004)
52 countries            
1981‐1998
5 most polluting 
industries and 5 
cleanest industries 
in the US (3‐digit 
ISIC)
Total RCA (descriptive 
analysis);                   
Bilateral trade (gravity 
equation) GDP per capita
GDP, Distance, Borders, 
Land lockedness,          
Quality of infrastructure
No evidence: RCA decompositions 
revealed no evidence of trade flows 
being driven by regulatory gap (some 
positive evidence for the nonmetallic 
and metallic sectors); result 
confirmed by gravity model 
estimation: explanation high natural 
barriers to trade in the typical heavily 
polluting industries. 
Cole et al. (2005)
US                     
1978‐1994
96 3‐digit SIC 
manufacturing 
industries
RCA; Net Exports/Value 
Added
Pollution Abatement Costs/Value 
Added                               
(PAC)
Non‐wage value added 
share, share of value 
added to skilled workers, 
Tariffs
Pollution abatement costs do have 
negative effects on net trade, 
however there is no evidence of 
falling specialization in dirty 
industries in the US. Explanation: 
factor intensities more important, 
dirty industries are more phisical and 
human capital intensive.  
Levinson and Taylor (2008)
US, Canada and Mexico  
1977‐1986
130 3‐digit 
manufacturing 
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US bilateral                 
Net Exports/Value Added
Pollution Abatement Costs/Value 
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(PAC) Tariffs
Evidence of pollution haven: an 
increase in PAC lead to an increase of 
US net imports from Mexico and 
Canada.  
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